Risk-Related Disclosure:A Review of the Literature and an Agenda for Future Research by Tahat, Yasean A. et al.
                                                                    
University of Dundee
Risk-Related Disclosure
Tahat, Yasean A.; Dunne, Theresa; Fifield, Suzanne; Power, David
Published in:
Accounting Forum
DOI:
10.1080/01559982.2019.1584953
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Tahat, Y. A., Dunne, T., Fifield, S., & Power, D. (2019). Risk-Related Disclosure: A Review of the Literature and
an Agenda for Future Research. Accounting Forum, 43(2), 193-219.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01559982.2019.1584953
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Jan. 2021
 
Risk-Related Disclosure:  
A Review of the Literature and an Agenda for Future Research 
Yasean Tahata, Theresa Dunneb, Suzanne Fifieldb & David Powerb
aGulf University for Science & Technology, Kuwait 
bUniversity of Dundee, UK 
Corresponding Author: 
Dr. Theresa Dunne 
School of Business 
University of Dundee 
Dundee, DD1 4HN, UK 
Tel: +44 1382 385174 
Fax: +44 1382 388421 
Email: t.m.dunne@dundee.ac.uk 
1
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting Forum on 25 April 2019, 
available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/01559982.2019.1584953.
 
 
Dr Yasean Tahat is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Accounting & MIS at the Gulf 
University of Science & Technology in Kuwait. He was awarded his PhD on the impact of IFRS 
7 on the value relevance of Jordanian companies from the University of Dundee. His primary 
research interests are in the area of financial reporting and international accounting. 
 
Dr Theresa Dunne is a Senior Lecturer in Accounting in the School of Social Sciences at the 
University of Dundee, UK. Dr Dunne has published in a wide range of academic and professional 
journals on areas such as accountability, financial reporting, accounting standard setting, charity 
accounting and governance, international accounting, XBRL, treasury practice and control and 
corporate governance. 
 
Dr Suzanne Fifield is a Senior Lecturer in Finance in the School of Social Sciences at the 
University of Dundee, UK. Her research areas are primarily in the broad area of international 
finance, with a particular emphasis in the broad area of international finance, with a particular 
emphasis on emerging stock markets. Specific areas of research include: stock market efficiency, 
international portfolio diversification, the performance of technical trading rules and emerging 
stock markets. She has published numerous refereed articles in these areas. 
 
David Power is Professor of Business Finance at the University of Dundee. His PhD from the 
University of Dundee was on stock market overreaction in the UK and this interest in financial 
issues has continued throughout his research. The main themes of his research relate to the 
communication between companies and investors and how share prices respond to such signals. 
This study of the market reaction to company signals has examined emerging as well as developed 
markets. He has published widely in both UK and international journals and is on the editorial 
board of a number of periodicals. 
 
 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, 
or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
 
  
2
 
 
Risk-Related Disclosure: 
A Review of the Literature and an Agenda for Future Research 
 
This paper critically examines the literature on risk reporting, largely dominated by the 
accounting standards for financial instruments (FI) issued by the FASB and the IASB. The 
analysis is motivated by the increased amount of FI-related research published in recent 
years, as well as by the conflicting findings that have emerged from these investigations. The 
increasing usage of risk-related FI, together with the financial collapses that this use has 
precipitated, provides a need for a review of research in this area. In discussing the key 
conclusions that emerge from the review, the paper identifies an agenda for future research 
and points to key omissions and deficiencies in the extant literature on risk reporting. 
Keywords: Accounting Standards; Financial Instruments; Financial Reporting; Risk Disclosure; 
Value Relevance. 
 
3
 
 
1. Introduction 
During the 1980s, financial companies started to develop innovative financial products, called FI1. 
Indeed, Miller (1991) argued that the emergence of FI resulted in a revolutionary change in capital 
markets2 as a growing number of firms started to use these products. In particular, the use of FI 
derivatives increased by 1,700% between 1990 and 2014, from $57.5 trillion to $696 trillion 
(Abdel-Khalik and Chen, 2015). According to the literature, the primary motives for this increased 
usage of FI included reducing risk exposure, managing liquidity, speculation and profit-making 
(Jacque, 2010). Alongside this growth in the usage of these instruments, the number and types of 
FI available have risen enormously in recent years. As a result of these developments, several 
studies have suggested that a great deal of stress has been placed upon the representational claims 
made for accounting because of the risks associated with FI usage and the changes which such 
instruments can facilitate in the risk profile of a firm (Young, 1996; Power, 2010). In particular, 
some commentators have argued that the narrow “institutional thinking” of standard-setters 
explains the accounting approach adopted for FI, and that this approach ignores “the 
macroeconomic consequences of sanctioning the proliferation of complex, unregulated, and 
systemically dangerous financial products” (Arnold, 2009, p. 806). 
 
As a result of concerns regarding the risks arising from FI, major accounting standard-setters, 
including the FASB and the IASB, have emphasized the importance of providing useful risk-
related accounting information about economic entities for investor and creditor decision-making 
(Arnold, 2009). In particular, these organizations have introduced a number of FI and risk-
reporting related standards and altered the nature of the accounting disclosures that are mandated 
(Hernández, 2003). However, the increasing sophistication of new FI has presented a challenge 
for accounting standard-setters. As a result, standard-setters have changed their reporting 
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requirements for FI on several occasions. However, it has been argued that these changes in the 
accounting regulation of FI and their related risks have contributed to an expansion in companies’ 
usage of FI either for hedging or speculation purposes (Abdel-Khalik and Chen, 2015). Hence, 
recent years have seen a surge in demand for improved risk reporting by companies and this 
demand has intensified markedly following the 2007/08 global financial crisis3 (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), 2011). This increased demand is based 
on the assumption that improved risk reporting will lead to a better understanding of business risks 
by investors and other users of corporate reporting and will, in turn, result in improved stewardship 
and a more efficient allocation of resources (ICAEW, 2011). An essential component of this 
demand for risk reporting stems from the new and increased risks that firms face, particularly in 
relation to FI (ICAEW 2003, 2009, 2011; Power, 2004). These risks have been highlighted by the 
continuing corporate scandals, where the (ab)use of FI has contributed to firms’ financial distress, 
as well as the accusation that accounting exacerbated the 2007/08 financial crisis. Indeed, Douglas 
(1986) argued that the failure to interrogate accounting more deeply, as well as the insistence of 
accounting standard-setters that FI should be considered within the existing conceptual framework, 
have contributed to difficulties in recognizing, measuring and reporting FI and their associated 
risks. 
 
The increased use of FI has resulted in several cases of financial loss and bankruptcy. In order to 
provide the users of financial statements with useful information for investment decision-making 
purposes (and thereby enable them to avoid investing in loss-making or bankrupt entities), 
accounting standard-setters (e.g. the FASB and the IASB) have introduced a number of standards 
which have sought to recognize FI in firms’ financial statements. The main aim of this paper is to 
critically examine the extant literature on risk reporting, largely dominated by the accounting 
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standards for FI issued by the FASB and the IASB. The current analysis is motivated by the 
financial value of these instruments noted earlier, the increased volume of FI-related research that 
has been published in recent years, as well as by the conflicting findings that have emerged from 
these investigations. In addition, the increasing usage of risk-related FI, together with the financial 
collapses that this use has precipitated, provides a need for a review of research in this area. 
Further, the continuing attempts by the IASB and the FASB at introducing FI-related accounting 
standards provide a rationale for reviewing the literature on FI in order to evaluate the efficacy of 
the various standards that have been adopted. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
accounting standards relating to FI disclosure which have been issued by the main regulatory 
bodies. Sections 3 – 5 explain the scope of the current analysis and present a comprehensive review 
of the extant empirical literature on FI disclosure. Finally, Section 6 discusses the key conclusions 
that emerge from the review of the extant literature and identifies a number of areas where future 
research is needed. 
 
2. Financial Instruments Accounting Standards Issued by the FASB and the IASB 
Accounting for FI has been one of the most controversial standard-setting issues in the last two 
decades (Tahat, Dunne, Fifield and Power, 2016a). Chau, Chau and Chan (2000) argued that three 
major issues need to be addressed when accounting for FI: recognition, measurement and 
disclosure. Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo (2006) suggested that these issues are not substitutes for each 
other and that all of them should be considered when investigating this area. Major accounting 
regulators have followed this delineation when issuing standards that account for FI. Initially, the 
IASB and the FASB concentrated on disclosure but, with the application of IFRS 9, Financial 
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Instruments, in January 2018, the emphasis on recognition and measurement has increased in their 
pronouncements. 
 
In 1986, the FASB commenced discussions about FI. Initially, they focused on FI disclosures, and 
introduced the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 105, Disclosure of Off-
Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk, in 1990; this 
standard emphasized the risk associated with off-balance sheet FI, especially credit risk (FASB, 
1990). This standard was followed by SFAS 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial 
Instruments, in 1991, which focused on the disclosure of fair values for FI (FASB, 1991). In 1994, 
the FASB issued SFAS 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of 
Financial Instruments, which addressed the question of disclosure about FI derivatives and the fair 
value of FI instruments (FASB, 1994). In terms of recognition, measurement, and hedge 
accounting, the FASB issued SFAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity 
Securities, in 1993, which focused on accounting for some investments in debt and equity 
securities with derivative characteristics (FASB, 1993). In 1998, the FASB issued SFAS 133, 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, which was aimed at improving 
financial reporting disclosures about the use of FI derivatives; it classified derivatives into two 
main categories: trading derivatives and hedging derivatives (FASB, 1998). SFAS 133 was 
controversial as it required different accounting treatments for both categories4. The statement was 
issued as a result of past significant losses involving derivative products and the standard tried to 
limit corporate hedging to risk management activities rather than the smoothing of earnings 
(Ighian, 2012). Abdel-Khalik and Chen (2015) argued that the introduction of SFAS 133 had 
unintended consequences; it incentivized firms to use more FI derivatives for hedging purposes 
without concern for any associated rise in the volatility of reported earnings. Since the adoption of 
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SFAS 133, the FASB has issued further pronouncements regarding the measurement and 
disclosure of FI (See Figure 1). 
 
The IASB adopted a similar approach to that employed by the FASB by introducing several 
accounting standards concerning FI. Figure 2 highlights the FI-related accounting standards that 
have been issued by the IASB, including IAS 30 (Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks 
and Similar Financial Institutions), IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation), IAS 39 
(Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement), IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure) and IFRS 9. The IASB issued IAS 30 in 1990; it concentrated on FI disclosure and 
only applied to financial institutions (IASC, 1991). In 1995, the IASB issued IAS 32 which dealt 
with all types of FI (recognized and unrecognized). The main objective of IAS 32 was to ensure 
that companies provided information that enhanced users’ understanding about the impact of FI 
on an entity’s financial position, performance and cash flows (IASC, 1995). In 1998, the IASB 
introduced IAS 39 (IASC, 1998) which gave rise to a great deal of debate and controversy due to 
the complexity of its requirements (Helliar and Dunne, 2004; Helliar, Dunne and Moir, 2004). The 
standard determined that: (i) all FI should be recognized on the balance sheet; (ii) all FI should be 
measured at fair value; and (iii) hedge accounting activities should be allowed. The IASB issued 
IFRS 7 in 2006; this standard must be applied by all listed firms (financial and non-financial) using 
the IASB’s standards and it covers all categories of FI as well as the risks arising from the use of 
FI (IASB, 2006). IFRS 7 concentrates on FI disclosure and is based on the notion that companies 
must provide disclosures in their financial statements that help users to assess the significance of 
FI for companies’ financial positions and performances (IASB, 2006). In 2009, the IASB issued 
IFRS 9: Financial Instruments; the standard focuses on classification and measurement and 
became effective in January 2018 (IASB, 2014). 
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Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here 
 
A comparison of the standards issued by the FASB and the IASB relating to FI reveals a number 
of similarities and differences, which are summarized in Table 1. A visual inspection of this table 
indicates that the pronouncements of the two standard-setters share a number of common 
characteristics. First, both US and IFRS GAAP share a similar conceptual basis which is 
underpinned by the decision-usefulness framework. This approach states that “the primary 
objective of financial reporting is to provide information useful to current and prospective 
investors and creditors in making investment, credit and similar resource allocation decisions” 
(IASB, 2006, para. 6). Second, both of them require that FI be classified into specific categories 
in order to: (i) determine the disclosure requirements and measurement of FI; (ii) clarify when an 
instrument should be recognized or derecognized in the financial statements; (iii) include all FI in 
the balance sheet; and (iv) report detailed information in the notes to the financial statements about 
the FI which are reported in the balance sheet. Third, they allow the use of hedge accounting and 
the fair value option for FI. 
 
However, there are some important differences between US and IFRS GAAP in dealing with FI; 
these are also explained in Table 1. For example, the table indicates that US GAAP adopt a rules-
based approach which means that companies in the US operate under a strict system of detailed 
rules when preparing financial statements5. On the other hand, IFRS GAAP is principles-based 
and focuses on a set of key objectives rather than detailed rules for financial reporting purposes6. 
Table 1 also indicates that they differ in a number of ways regarding the treatment of FI, namely: 
(i) the classification of FI as debt or equity; while the FASB requires that instruments which have 
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the characteristics of both equity and liabilities, such as convertible bonds, must be classified as 
liabilities, the IASB considers them as contractual obligations; and (ii) the recognition and 
measurement of impairment losses; the FASB requires that impairment losses incurred as a result 
of a decline in fair value must be reported in the income statement, while the IASB allows a firm 
to choose whether or not to recognize and measure these losses based on evidence about the 
likelihood of credit default. Further specific areas of difference are also outlined in Table 1 such 
as the measurement of loans and receivables as well as fair value. Differences in the boards’ 
accounting standards in general, and in FI-related standards in particular, have led to the FASB 
and the IASB working jointly in order to harmonize their requirements; they began this 
Convergence process in 2000. Since 2006, the boards have been engaged in a joint project called 
Accounting for Financial Instruments (IASB, 2008). The objective of this joint project is to 
significantly improve the decision-usefulness of FI disclosure for users of financial statements 
(Ighian, 2012). This joint work resulted in the introduction of a discussion paper by both standard-
setters in 2008 called Reducing the Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments. This 
discussion paper concentrates on the measurement of FI and hedge accounting as well as on 
identifying possible approaches7 to reducing the complexity inherent in accounting for FI. Despite 
some fierce opposition by preparers (Tahat, 2013), the full fair value model was identified as the 
long-term goal of both the IASB and the FASB for the improvement of their FI standards up to the 
time of the global financial crisis (IASB 2008). 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3. Research Approach 
Beattie (2005) argued that the primary intended audience of literature review studies is academics 
at the outset of their research career. In particular, she argued that literature reviews offer such 
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individuals a point of entry to the research methods and key studies in a particular area. Other 
audiences for such reviews are educators and students seeking a thorough knowledge of a given 
sub-field. By mapping out the domain of a field, a review provides a useful aid, acting as an 
“advance organizer” to encourage integrated learning (Mayer, 1987, p. 120). In addition, reviews 
allow researchers and policy-makers in an area to take stock; to evaluate progress and identify gaps 
as well as fruitful lines for future inquiry or policy development. This review aims to aid all of 
these groups. In addition, this paper aims to alert editors and readers to the coverage that risk 
reporting receives within their journals. As such, it may stimulate debate on aspects of this area 
that are absent from journals and encourage research into FI-related issues that are not examined 
in the academic literature. 
 
The primary review is focused on papers published over the last twenty years on the topic of risk 
disclosure. In particular, Google Scholar was used to search for English language publications with 
at least one of the following phrases in the title: IAS 32; IAS 39; IFRS 7; SFAS 133; Risk 
Disclosure. These phrases were selected in order to focus on publications relating to the topic of 
this review. In addition, a decision was taken to concentrate on the title of the article since a large 
number of publications might otherwise be identified with little or no relevance to the main focus 
of the research. Furthermore, the search was conducted for articles that were published over the 
period 1998 – 2018 inclusive. The year 1998 was selected as the first year of the search as this 
coincides with the development of IAS 39 in December 1998 and the issuance of SFAS 133 in 
June 1998. A total of 918 “results” were identified by this initial screening of the literature; of 
these, 597 related to “Risk Disclosure” while the remaining 321 mentioned at least one of the four 
accounting standards in their title. The total number of results was reduced to 664 upon the 
exclusion of citations and patents. This list of results was scrutinized and publications involving 
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risk disclosure in non-corporate settings (for example, those relating to medical risk, climate 
change, cyber-attacks and real estate) were eliminated; this reduced the sample to 556 publications. 
Of these, just under 40% were published in the last five years (2014-2018) examined, while only 
nine were published in the years 1998-2000. In addition, a majority of these “results” were issued 
either in journals that were ranked 2* or below8 by the ABS (Chartered Association of Business 
Schools (CABS), 2015) or on websites. A detailed inspection revealed that only 19 articles were 
published in the 27 accounting journals that were ranked as 3* or 4* by the ABS in 2015. Of these, 
four were in the Accounting Review, three were in each of Accounting and Business Research and 
the International Journal of Accounting, two were in each of the British Accounting Review, and 
the Review of Accounting Studies, and one was in each of Accounting Forum, the European 
Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting and Management Accounting Research. 
These 19 articles were selected for further scrutiny. For every one of these 19 articles identified, 
the geographical location, theoretical and methodological frameworks, method, and findings were 
reviewed. Such a focus is of value because it acts as a heuristic device, enhancing our 
understanding of how the literature has evolved and aiding our interpretation of the contributions 
made by different studies (Rudner, 1966). In addition, this focus facilitates an evaluation of the 
impact of the research effort on the development of accounting policy in the area. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
4. The ‘Top-ranking’ Risk Disclosure Literature 
Table 2 presents an overview of the 19 studies contained in CABS 3* and 4* journals over the past 
twenty years. A number of noteworthy observations emerge from this summary. First, studies 
published in these journals tend to be based on datasets emerging from developed markets, with 
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seven studies based on US data and five employing UK data. Only one study cast a wide net, 
utilizing observations from 21 countries. As the journals scrutinized were all published in 
developed countries, this observation is probably not surprising. However, the dominance of 
Anglo-American studies on this topic in the top-ranking journals is worthy of further 
consideration. 
 
Second, the vast majority of these papers are largely atheoretical in their approaches, employing 
positivist methodologies based around hypotheses tested using regression analysis. Thus, 
quantitative approaches dominate with little attention focused on ascertaining perspectives on the 
approaches promulgated by standard-setters. Notably, Abraham and Shrives (2014) provide an 
exception to this generalization by employing an institutional lens to explore longitudinal 
disclosures and highlighting the important role played by stakeholders in improving risk reporting. 
In particular, Abraham and Schrives (2014) propose a model based around three questions which 
managers and other stakeholders, such as users, regulators and auditors, can use for both preparing 
and assessing the quality of risk reporting in annual reports9. Some six of the papers reviewed were 
normative, often developing a model about the impact of FIs on decision-making (e.g. Nan, 2011) 
or some aspect of firm performance (Heinle and Smith (2017) or proposing an approach to quantify 
the risk associated with FIs (Cabedo and Tirado, 2014). 
 
Third, the majority of these studies have focused on risk disclosure within banks. While, 
undoubtedly, the importance of risk disclosures around FIs are heightened within these institutions 
(Ahmed et al., 2011; Kilic et al., 2013; Lim et al, 2013; O’Hanlon, 2013), the omission of other 
sections of the reporting community within the top-ranking literature is arguably problematic. The 
omission is all the more surprising since many of the scandals relating to the misuse of FIs emanate 
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from non-financial firms (e.g. Ashanti Goldfields, Gibson Greetings, Metallgesellchaft, Procter & 
Gamble10) where (i) unlike in banks, those in control often did not have sufficient expertise to 
understand the products that they were using (Capelle-Blancard, 2010); and (ii) users of financial 
statements by non-financial firms are less knowledgeable about FIs since they typically lack the 
specialist training and expertise in the capital markets arena as compared to the readers of financial 
statements issued by financial institutions (Koonce, Lipe and McAnally, 2005; Hamilton and 
Winchel, 2018). Further, the omission suggests a lag in the accounting literature since standard-
setters have widened the scope of their pronouncements beyond financial institutions since 1995; 
this reporting on FI-related risks by non-financial firms has not appeared in the top-ranking 
journals to any great extent but instead tends to get published in 1* and 2* journals (Lajili and 
Zehgal, 2005; El-Masry, 2006; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006, 2008; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 
2011). 
 
While these studies undoubtedly constitute an important contribution to the topic of risk disclosure, 
their restricted focus and elitism limits the debate on both the implications of this form of reporting 
and the potential of this literature to add to the accounting academe. 
 
5. The Remaining Risk Disclosure Literature 
The vast majority of the risk disclosure literature has been published in non-CABS 3* and 4* 
journals. In attempting to organize this broad literature, this section will examine studies that focus 
on risk reporting broadly, leading to a discussion of research that specifically deals with FI, before 
concluding with an emerging theme exploring the value relevance of these disclosures. 
 
5.1 Risk Disclosure 
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In recent years, risk reporting has grown in importance within the financial reporting arena 
(Kajuter, 2001; Linsley and Shrives, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Dobler, 2008; Bhat, Cai, Frankel and 
Martin, 2011; Nelson and Rupar, 2011; Bhat, Ryan and Vyas, 2012; Abraham and Shrives, 2014). 
It is certainly the case that changing economic and regulatory environments, more complex capital 
structures, increasing reliance on FI, the growth of international funding transactions and 
prominent corporate crises have all focused increasing attention on risk reporting (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Before recent changes in regulations (e.g. IFRS 7, 
SFAS 133), the publication of risk-related information remained at the discretion of individual 
company management (Dobler, 2008). Thus, Linsley and Shrives (2006) argued that, despite the 
fact that the topic of risk reporting had recently received considerable attention in the financial 
area, this had yet to be reflected in the empirical research examining firms’ risk disclosures. 
Nevertheless, a number of empirical studies have examined risk reporting throughout the world11. 
The findings of these studies indicate that: (i) firms were not providing a complete picture of the 
risks they faced within their financial statements and a significant proportion of risk disclosures 
consisted of generalized statements of risk information policy; (ii) there was minimal disclosure 
of quantitative risk information and narrative information was more prevalent; and (iii) investors 
believed that a complete risk profile of a company was very important in assessing the prospects 
and the value of a firm. 
 
In the US, regulators addressed risk disclosures by a number of statements in order to improve 
further on the disclosure of risk-related information associated with FI: (i) Financial Reporting 
Release (FRR) No. 48 (market risk disclosure); (ii) SFAS 105 (off-balance sheet risk); (iii) SFAS 
133 (credit risk); and (iv) SFAS 157, Fair Value Measurements, (liquidity risk). Accordingly, a 
sizeable amount of North American research has investigated mandatory risk disclosures based 
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upon these pronouncements (Elmy, LeGuyader and Linsmeier, 1998; Rajgopal, 1999; Roulstone, 
1999; Hodder. Koonce and McAnally, 2001; Jorion, 2002; Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam 
and Welker, 2002; Lim and Tan, 2007; Pérignon and Smith, 2010; Bhat, Frankel and Martin, 
2011a, b; Riedl and Serafeim, 2011). The findings in this area have indicated that these new 
regulations have had a positive impact on risk reporting; regulations have limited discretion by 
mandating risk disclosures by type and format. In addition, they have pointed out that, before the 
new regulations, market measures of interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate exposures and total 
risk were largely absent despite an increased use of FI derivatives. With respect to IFRS GAAP, 
prior to 2007, risk disclosure associated with FI was embedded in IAS 32. This standard focused 
only on credit risk and interest rate risk (Young and Guenther, 2003). Bradbury (2003) argued that 
one of the underlying weaknesses of the IASB framework was that it largely ignored risk 
disclosure. However, this situation changed after the introduction of IFRS 7; risk disclosure 
associated with FI now occupies a major part of the disclosure requirements contained within IFRS 
7. Indeed, Coetsee (2010) argued that IFRS 7 has placed a considerable focus on risk disclosure 
and a discussion of how management controls such risks. Investigating the impact of IFRS 7 on 
European banks’ risk disclosure, Bischof (2009) documented a significant increase in the amount 
of risk-related information associated with FI usage. This result is in line with US literature which 
has explored the usefulness of quantitative disclosures on market risk required by FRR No. 48 
(Roulstone, 1999; Blankley, Lamb and Schroeder, 2000; Solomon, Solomon, Norton and Joseph, 
2000). Serious criticism has also been levelled at the standards for being overly complex, rigid and 
burdensome, and preventing companies from adequately portraying the economics of their risk 
management activities, thus resulting in less prudent risk management decisions (Gebhardt, 2012). 
 
5.2 Risk Disclosures Associated with Financial Instruments 
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FI are deemed to be an important component of a company’s financial statements (Bischof, 2009). 
Specifically, FI account for, on average, up to 90% of total assets and liabilities in the financial 
statements; hence, FI information is expected to be a material constituent of a firm’s disclosure 
level and to influence the capital markets’ valuation of a company (Bischof, 2009). The current 
review largely focuses on studies investigating FI-related information based on the accounting 
standards issued by the FASB and the IASB. However, a number of investigations on the impact 
of accounting standards concerning FI disclosure have also been conducted in other countries such 
as Australia, the UK, Malaysia and the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the decision was taken to 
concentrate on the accounting standards of the FASB and the IASB as most studies have 
investigated their impacts (for the FASB, see Goldberg, Tritschler and Godwin, 1994; Edwards 
and Eller, 1995; Mahoney and Kawamura, 1995; Palmer and Schwarz, 1995; Hamlen and Largay, 
2005; Zhang, 2009; for the IASB, see Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006, 2008; Bischof, 2009; Bamber 
and McMeeking, 2010; Gebhardt, 2012). 
 
Table 3 summarizes key features of these studies. An inspection of the table shows that most of 
these studies have: (i) focused on the information provided about derivative products and 
overlooked other types of FI; (ii) analyzed disclosures in the annual reports of companies; (iii) 
used either the disclosure index technique or the content analysis method; and (iv) investigated the 
change or the usefulness of information provided following the introduction of new accounting 
standards dealing with FI. A comparison of the findings from these studies is not always easy. For 
instance, the investigations use different sample sizes ranging from a few companies with only ten 
annual reports (Edwards and Eller, 1995) to the inclusion of 600 firms (Gebhardt, 2012). In 
addition, some of the studies are sector-specific - concentrating on banking (Edwards and Eller, 
1995), industrial companies (Hamlen and Largay, 2005) or firms from the manufacturing industry 
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(Hamlen and Largay, 2005). Others are more general and include both financial and non-financial 
firms (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006, 2008). Furthermore, these studies examine the impact of a 
variety of accounting standards on FI. Nevertheless, despite these differences a number of findings 
emerge from an analysis of these investigations. 
 
Panel A of Table 3 details US studies that have investigated FI disclosure matters. In general, these 
studies have concluded that the introduction of new accounting standards dealing with FI 
disclosure has enhanced the transparency, the visibility, completeness and diversity (quantitative 
and qualitative) of FI-related information within the financial statements (Goldberg, Tritschler and 
Godwin, 1994; Palmer and Schwarz; 1995; Goldberg, Godwin, Tritschler and Myung-Sun, 1998; 
Edwards and Eller, 1995; Herz, Bushee and Elmy, 1995; Mahoney and Kawamura, 1995; 
Kawamura, 1996; Hodder, Koonce and McAnally, 2001; Hernández, 2003; Bhamornsiri and 
Schroeder, 2004; Hamlen and Largay, 2005; Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo, 2006; Zhang, 2009). 
However, some studies have documented a negative impact on the clarity of the information 
disclosed (Palmer and Schwarz, 1995), the variability of the form, content and the terminology 
employed (Goldberg, Godwin, Tritschler and Myung-Sun, 1998), and the comparability of 
information supplied (Hernández, 2003). For example, Hernández (2003) argued that the 
application of SFAS 133 has led to comparability problems as FI derivatives can be accounted for 
in many different ways in terms of financial instrument designation and measurement. In addition, 
this SFAS promoted the use of FI for earnings management over hedging purposes (Barton, 2001; 
Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo, 2006). 
Insert Table 3 here 
Panel B of Table 3 summarizes key features of studies that have investigated the impact of FI-
related standards issued by the IASB (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006, 2008; Bischof, 2009; Bamber 
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and McMeeking, 2010; Gebhardt, 2012). Examining FI-related information under IAS 39 reported 
by a sample of European-listed companies, Lopes and Rodrigues (2008) found that the sampled 
firms, which had sophisticated information systems and advanced accounting practices, were not 
fully compliant with the standards in terms of accounting for FI. They noted that: (i) about 50% of 
sampled companies used fair value for held-for-trading financial assets, but less than half of the 
firms adopted this criterion for available-for-sale financial assets as required by IAS 39; and (ii) a 
large proportion of companies disclosed fair value determination methods but the information was 
far from clear and objective, preventing the fair value information from being relevant and useful.  
 
Following the introduction of IFRS 7, early studies were largely descriptive, with Bischof (2009) 
noting found that FI disclosure levels (both qualitative and quantitative) among European banks 
increased significantly following IFRS 7’s introduction. Similarly, using a sample from FTSE 100 
non-financial companies, Bamber and McMeeking (2010) documented a similar increase. More 
recently, using a sample of non-financial firms from 17 European countries, Gebhardt (2012) 
investigated FI disclosure practices based on the requirements of IFRS 7 and IAS 39, using content 
analysis. In particular, the study found that (i) companies classified their FI in the financial 
statements according to the classes identified by the standards; and (ii) most fair value 
measurements were assessed by reference to quoted prices for similar FI products (level 1) and 
directly observable market inputs (level 2), while only 10.3% of fair values were not based on 
observable market data. Using an emerging country sample, Tahat, Dunne, Fifield and Power 
(2016a) investigated the impact of IFRS 7 on the significance of FI disclosure and found that the 
new requirements for FI disclosure enhance the usefulness of FI-related information. Nevertheless, 
they pointed out that compliance with IFRS 7 requirements was somewhat low. 
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In general, the broad literature concludes that the FI-related accounting standards issued by the 
IASB have affected the reporting behavior of companies by increasing their level of disclosure 
about FI activities; this change may have increased the usefulness of financial statements. 
However, some studies have argued that the regulatory pronouncements are flawed. For instance, 
Harrington (2012) indicated that the complexity of IAS 39’s requirements (in terms of recognition 
and measurement) represented a key barrier to proper FI disclosure practices12. For example, 
although understandability is one of the building blocks of the decision usefulness approach, 
Gebhardt (2012) argued that investors and analysts find FI disclosures difficult to comprehend. 
 
5.3 Studies on the Value Relevance of Financial Instruments 
Continuing developments and changes in FI-related accounting standards resulted in more 
information being provided about FI derivatives, fair value recognition and measurement. These 
changes are incentivized by the much-heralded primary objective of financial reporting that the 
provision of information about an economic entity is useful to existing and potential investors, 
lenders and other creditors in making investment and credit decisions (Ishikawa, 2005). A common 
research methodology to assess usefulness is to analyze the association between share prices and 
accounting numbers, the so called value relevance approach; the result of such an association 
provides evidence of the usefulness of changes in accounting standards since their introductions 
are linked to variations in market values (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1996). 
 
The vast majority of FI-related value relevance studies have been conducted in the US using a 
sample from the finance industry (e.g., Barth, 1994; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1996; Eccher, 
Ramesh and Thiagarajan, 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Park and Ro, 1999; Song, Thomas and Yi, 
2010). For instance, Wang, Alam and Makar (2005) investigated the usefulness of disaggregated 
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disclosures supplied by a sample of 161 commercial banks under FAS 119 and FAS 133. The 
results revealed that the expanded disclosure provided under FAS 133 was value relevant; 
derivative information under FAS 133 (e.g. interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk) was useful in 
explaining variations in a bank’s equity values. In terms of the research focus, some studies 
emphasize the value relevance of FI disclosure (e.g. Barth, 1994; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 
1996), while other studies stress FI recognition and measurement (Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo, 2006; 
Song, Thomas and Yi, 2010). In addition, fair value measurement appears to be value relevant. It 
is certainly the case that fair value details concerning FI usage have been viewed as controversial; 
hence, a large proportion of the accounting literature has concentrated on examining their 
relevance for equity pricing (Horton and Macve, 2000). Using a sample of US banks, Ahmed, 
Kilic and Lobo (2006) found that the valuation coefficients on recognized FI derivatives were 
significant, whereas the valuation coefficients on disclosed FI derivatives were not significant, 
suggesting that recognition and measurement are not substitutes. However, Laux (2012) argued 
that fair values are not a panacea for more transparency or better reporting; fair values are based 
on models and management judgment, which can be distorted. 
 
Studies on the value relevance of FI under IFRS GAAP are very scare. The only exception to this 
generalization relates to Bonetti (2011) and Tahat, Dunne, Fifield and Power (2016b). Bonetti 
(2011) investigated the usefulness of the sensitivity analysis disclosure on currency risk mandated 
by IFRS 7 for Italian investors. The findings revealed that post the adoption of IFRS 7, investors 
did proper assessment of firms’ exposures to currency risk while this was not the case beforehand. 
In addition, she indicated that the market reaction of a firm’s share prices to exchange rate changes 
appeared to be linked with the quantitative information provided under IFRS 7. Using a sample of 
82 Jordanian companies, Tahat, Dunne, Fifield and Power (2016b) confirmed Bonetti’s results for 
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IFRS 7. Specifically, they examined whether different categories of FI disclosure were value 
relevant from the additional information supplied under IFRS 7. The main conclusion that emerged 
from this analysis was that risk information associated with the usage of FI had a strong 
relationship with companies’ market values. Furthermore, they discovered that the inclusion of 
risk information about FI under IFRS 7 increased the proportion of share price differences 
explained. Thus, it can be concluded that the new requirements (both qualitative and quantitative) 
about the risks arising from FI (including credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk) provided under 
IFRS 7 may have enhanced FI transparency and were useful for investors’ decision-making. 
 
6. Discussion, Conclusion and an Agenda for Future Research 
The primary objective of this paper is to provide a critical synthesis of the extant literature on risk 
disclosure. The paper noted that the usage of FI has increased exponentially over the last two 
decades and that, consequently, the demand for accounting standards on FI has intensified. This 
increased demand has arisen, in part, from a rise in the usage of FI which was not initially matched 
by an increase in information about these products in companies’ financial statements. The 
literature has long-established that such omissions have contributed to a number of financial 
scandals throughout the world involving the misuse of FI derivatives (Dunne and Helliar, 2002). 
The accounting standards that regulators have subsequently issued may be seen as a response to 
pressure from users concerned with losses associated with the seemingly relentless use of these 
products. Alternatively, the issuance of recent missives may simply be the latest instalment of the 
decision-usefulness agenda of the IASB. However, it is also possible that the issuance of these 
standards is a manifestation of a legitimation strategy whereby standard-setters wish to be seen to 
have played their part in terms of promulgating regulation should things go wrong. 
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This paper highlighted that the development and use of FI has placed an enormous pressure on 
accounting standard-setters to produce regulatory guidance on their measurement and disclosure. 
Both the FASB and the IASB have issued a number of standards in response to the development 
of FI. A key finding from the broad extant literature is that such standards have resulted in 
enhanced disclosure of FI-related information within financial statements, and that this 
information may be viewed as useful by investors because it enhances their economic decision-
making. This increased disclosure may be used to legitimize a firm’s accounting policies as, 
according to legitimacy theory, keeping investors’ informed of a firm’s on-going situation 
maintains its legitimacy. Hence, firms in general, and high-risk companies in particular, may be 
attempting to manage their legitimacy by releasing more useful information. However, it has been 
argued that attempts by the IASB and the FASB to accommodate FI under their current decision-
usefulness framework are flawed. In fact, several studies have argued that the introduction of some 
accounting standards has had a negative impact on the content, clarity, comparability, terminology 
and the understandability of FI information. In addition, the trade-off in focus between recognition, 
measurement and disclosure of FI, alongside the flexibility in application, has encouraged 
companies to use FI for earnings management rather than hedging purposes. 
 
The review of FI standards issued by the two main standard-setters has highlighted the diverging 
approaches adopted. In particular, the FASB is rooted to a rules-based paradigm whilst the IASB 
favors a principles-based approach. In the particular context of FI, we would argue that the FASB 
strategy seems deeply-flawed as financial firms are coming up with increasingly complex 
instruments that often render existing products and, therefore, extant standards redundant. This is 
not to imply that the IASB is free from criticism in this regard as recent amendments and 
interpretations point to principles-based standards that are looking increasing rules-driven. In 
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addition, the often rapid, disjointed and prescribed changes to standards may be seen to undermine 
their legitimacy. Perhaps it is time for the IASB to be cognizant of this and stick to their original 
modus operandi and issue principles-based standards? 
 
Efforts to enhance risk-related information appear to have been at the forefront of standard-setters’ 
minds over the past twenty years with the issuance of a number of new accounting standards on 
the topic. However, the dominance of matters relating to risk in the agenda of standard-setters has 
not been matched by discussion in the eminent accounting journals. Issues associated with journal 
rankings, and the potential role played by journal editors as gatekeepers to the profession, are not 
new to accounting discourse (Lee, 1997; Parker, Guthrie and Gray, 1998; Lee and Williams, 1999), 
but the present paper makes clear that the gatekeepers have a potentially important role to play in 
terms of limiting discourse on risk disclosure. The vast majority of publications on this topic are 
published outside the top-ranking journals; whilst this might reflect the relative immaturity of the 
topic compared to other aspects of accounting academe, other novel topics such as fair value 
accounting have been discussed in AOS four times between 2009 and 2015. Perhaps the technical 
nature of the material involved (Helliar et al., 2004) does not appeal to journal editors who eschew 
such content in favor of less contentious topics. 
 
On a related note, the relatively narrow geographical spread of the risk disclosure studies appearing 
in top-ranking journals is also worth considering. Lukka and Kasanen (1996) pointed to the 
competing pressures on authors to consider issues in an international setting whilst also trying to 
address (often practical) domestic concerns. This type of choice is also likely to be a live issue for 
journal editors who, in turn, will be under pressure from publishers to disseminate research to as 
wide an audience as possible. This context might have the perverse consequence of influencing 
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journal editors to prioritize studies from developed markets where a willing and substantial 
audience is likely.  
 
One finding of particular note in the present study is that the majority of papers appearing in top-
ranking journals largely shun theory. Most are based around positivist methodologies, emphasizing 
regression analysis and other econometric processes. However, IFRS 7 is clear in terms of 
articulating its aim of ensuring that users are provided with a holistic understanding of the role that 
financial instruments play in corporate activities. The focus on stewardship is of particular note 
and the absence of triangulating qualitative research that seeks out stakeholder perceptions 
arguably reflects this lack of theoretical foundation and certainly constitutes an area where further 
high-quality research is needed. 
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Table 1: Similarities and Differences Between US GAAP and IFRS in Terms of FI 
 
FI-related Issues  FASB IFRS 
Panel A: Similarities 
Conceptual Framework Decision-Usefulness Approach Decision-Usefulness Approach 
Classification of FI FI must be classified under specific categories in the balance sheet  FI must be classified under specific categories in the balance sheet 
Fair value option Permitted  Permitted 
Hedge accounting  Permitted Permitted 
Panel B: Differences 
Classification  
 
Certain FI (debt versus equity) with characteristics of both debt and 
equity must be classified as liabilities 
 
Compound FI (e.g. convertible bonds) are not split into debt and 
equity components 
Certain FI (debt versus equity) with characteristics of both debt and 
equity focuses on the contractual obligation 
 
Compound FI are required to be split into a debt and equity 
component 
Recognition and measurement 
for Impairment 
Available for sale debt instrument: Declining in fair value below cost 
may result in an impairment loss being recognized in the income 
statement 
 
Available for sale equity instrument: an impairment loss is 
recognized in the income statement if the equity instrument’s fair 
value is not expected to recover sufficiently in the near-term to allow 
a full recovery of the entity’s cost basis 
 
Held-to-maturity debt FI: the impairment loss of an instrument is 
measured as the difference between its fair value and amortized cost 
basis. The amount of the total impairment related to the credit loss is 
recognized in the income statement and the amount related to all 
other factors is recognized in other comprehensive income 
Available for sale debt instrument: only evidence of credit default 
results in an impairment loss being recognized in the income 
statement 
 
Available for sale equity instrument: an impairment loss is recognized 
in the income statement when there is objective evidence that the 
equity instrument is impaired and the cost of the investment in the 
equity instrument may not be recovered 
 
Held-to-maturity debt FI: The impairment loss of an instrument is 
measured as the difference between the carrying amount of the 
instrument and the present value of estimated future cash flows 
discounted at the instrument’s original effective interest rate. The 
amount of impairment loss is recognized in the income statement 
Hedge effectiveness 
Shortcut method for interest rate swaps is permitted. 
Inclusion of option’s time value is permitted 
Shortcut method for interest rate swaps is not permitted 
Inclusion of option’s time value is not permitted 
Derecognition 
Financial assets: derecognition occurs when effective control has 
been surrendered over the financial asset 
Financial assets: derecognition is based on a mixed model that 
considers both transfer of risks, rewards and control 
Measurements of loans and 
receivables 
Effective interest method: requires retrospective method or 
prospective method of calculating the interest for amortized cost-
based assets, depending on the type of instrument 
Effective interest method: requires the original effective interest rate 
to be used throughout the life of the instrument for all financial assets 
and liabilities 
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Loans and receivables: Unless the fair value option is selected, they 
are classified as either held for investment (amortized cost) or held 
for sale (fair value) 
 
Loans and receivables are carried at amortized cost unless classified 
into the fair value through profit or loss or the available for sale both 
of which are carried at fair value 
Fair value 
 
Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid 
to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants at the measurement date. Fair value is an exit price, 
which may differ from the transaction (entry) price 
 
Day one gains and losses: Entities are not precluded from 
recognizing them on financial instruments reported at fair value 
even when all inputs to the measurement model are not observable  
 
Bid-ask spread: The price is the most representative of fair value in 
the circumstances is used to measure fair value 
Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a 
liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s 
length transaction. At inception, transaction (entry) price generally is 
considered fair value 
 
Day one gains and losses are recognized only when all inputs to the 
measurement model are observable 
 
 
Bid-ask spread: the fair value of assets held is generally determined 
using the current bid price, while liabilities held are measured using 
the current ask price 
 
Note: This table provides the areas of similarities and differences between the FASB and IFRS with regard to standards concerning FI. 
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Table 2: Summary of Risk-Related Studies Published in Elite Journals 
Author(s) Journal Country 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Methodology Method Sample/Industry Key Findings 
Ma and Lambert 
(1998) 
ABR N/A N/A Normative Critique of 
IAS 32 
N/A The paper argues that IAS 32’s requirements on 
accounting for, and the classification of, compound 
financial instruments by issuer, are based on 
reasoning that is conceptually flawed. The authors 
propose that a compound financial instrument 
should be viewed as a single instrument, with a dual 
nature, comprising the nature of both the liability 
and equity. Under this concept, the instrument 
cannot be decomposed into several component 
parts; rather, it should be treated wholly as a liability 
or equity, depending on which nature is dominant. 
Solomon, 
Solomon, 
Norton and 
Joseph (2000) 
BAR UK Their own risk 
framework model 
Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
questionnaire 97 responses They use a questionnaire survey to canvas the 
attitudes of UK institutional investors towards risk 
disclosure in relation to their portfolio investment 
decisions. Their empirical findings indicate that 
institutional investors do not generally favor a 
regulated environment for corporate risk disclosure 
or a general statement of business risk.  
Cabedo and 
Tirado (2004) 
AF N/A N/A Normative theoretical One Spanish company 
as an example 
Value at risk (VaR) is a suitable method for 
quantifying most of a company’s risks. VaR 
can be used to measure business, credit and 
market risks. 
Marshall and 
Weetman 
(2007) 
JBFA US and UK Agency Theory and 
signalling 
Positivist with 
hypothesis testing 
Regression 
equation 
44 US and 78 UK non-
financial firms 
They find incomplete disclosure of FX risk in both 
US and UK samples but for different reasons. In the 
US case, the information gap is lower where the 
information is more relevant or where firms with 
higher financial risk are signalling the extent of risk, 
but the gap is greater where firms are in competitive 
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product markets. For the UK sample, the 
information gap is significantly lower where firms 
have higher financial risk or higher liquidity but the 
gap is greater where the shares are more closely 
held. 
Dobler (2008) IJA N/A Agency framework Normative Literature 
review 
N/A He argues that uncertainty of information 
endowment and issues of credible communication 
can explain restricted risk reporting observed 
empirically. He argues that regulation may mitigate 
the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but 
can have adverse effects on risk reporting. Overall 
results suggest that we should not overestimate the 
informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated 
environment. 
Ahmed, Kilic 
and Lobo 
(2011) 
TAR US N/A Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
Regression 
analysis 
141 US banks: 270 
bond issues for the pre-
SFAS 133 period and 
265 bond issues for the 
post-SFAS 133 period 
The results indicate that, contrary to critics’ claims, 
SFAS 133 has increased the risk relevance of 
accounting measures of derivatives exposures to 
bond investors and benefited banks in terms of 
reducing their cost of capital. 
Nan (2011) CAR US Agency Theory Normative Theoretical 
modelling 
N/A Demonstrates via a specific agency model that the 
early recognition of the unqualified use of 
derivatives may change the risk allocation in the 
manager’s compensation and motivate speculation. 
Miihkinen 
(2012) 
IJA Finland N/A Positivist Factor 
analysis and 
regression 
99 Finish firms giving 
198 observations 
They find increases in the quantity of risk disclosure 
following a new standard with more extensive and 
more comprehensive information. But they do not 
find a corresponding increase in quantitative 
disclosures and therefore there is some question 
regarding the influence of the standard on the 
substance of the risk information provided. 
Kilic and Lobo 
(2013) 
TAR US N/A Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
Regression 
analysis 
105 US derivative-user 
banks, 1998-2003: 40 
banks affected by 
SFAS 133 and 65 
Banks that are affected by SFAS 133 relied more on 
loan loss provisions to smooth income. The results 
also indicate that the increased reliance on loan loss 
provisions for smoothing income has impaired the 
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banks unaffected by 
SFAS 133 
informativeness of loan loss provisions for future 
defaults and bank stock returns. 
Lim, Lim and 
Lobo (2013) 
JAPP 21 countries*  N/A Positivist with 
hypothesis testing 
Regression 
equation 
79 Banks They look at the implications for analyst earnings 
forecasts of the IASB’s decision in 2008 to amend 
IAS 39 to allow banks to retroactively reclassify 
financial assets that previously were measured at 
fair value to amortized cost. This change potentially 
allowed a bank to avoid recognizing unrealized fair 
value losses and thereby increase its income and 
regulatory capital during a market downturn. They 
find that the reclassification choice during the 
financial crisis reduced analyst forecast accuracy 
and increased forecast dispersion. However, this 
observed decline in analyst forecasting ability is 
limited to the year of adoption when the economic 
environment was highly volatile. 
Makar, Wang 
and Alam 
(2013) 
RAS US Mixed Attribute 
Problem (MAP) 
and accounting 
information 
mispricing theory 
Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
Regression 
analysis 
144 US non-financial 
firms that use cash flow 
hedges 
Cash flow hedge losses and gains reported in other 
comprehensive income are inversely related to 
further cash flows. The results support FASB’s 
concern that the SFAS 133 mixed attribute model 
does not provide the information necessary for 
investors to understand the next economic effects of 
derivatives use. 
O’Hanlon 
(2013) 
ABR UK N/A Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
Regression 
analysis 
37 UK banks, 2001 – 
2008 (the period before 
and after IAS 39) 
The paper examines whether loan-loss provisioning 
by UK banks was less timely under IAS 39 than 
under the less strict requirements of the previous 
UK incurred-loss regime. The results indicate that 
the stricter requirements of IAS 39 has not resulted 
in less timely loan-loss provisioning. 
Abraham and 
Shrives (2014) 
BAR UK Institutional theory 
and proprietary cost 
theory 
Normative 
approach 
Longitudinal 
study and 
content 
analysis 
Four companies Results suggest that company managers prefer 
providing disclosures that are symbolic rather than 
substantive. They argue that institutional factors and 
proprietary costs contribute towards and can explain 
this behavior. They also highlight the role that 
stakeholders including managers, users, regulators 
38
 
 
and auditors can play in improving the quality of 
risk reporting. 
Gillan and 
Panasian (2014) 
IJA Canada N/A Positivist with 
hypothesis testing 
Univariate 
and 
multivariate 
(regression) 
analysis 
210 observations They find that director and officer insurance 
premiums for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US 
are more than twice those of Canadian-only listed 
firms, and audit fees are approximately 50% higher. 
While this supports the view that both service-
providers view the US as a more litigious 
environment, our findings also suggest that these 
differentials for cross-listed firms reflect premia for 
both litigation risk and the complexity of firms' 
financial disclosures. 
Brasel, Doxey, 
Grenier and 
Reffett (2016) 
TAR US N/A Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
Between-
participants 
experimental 
design and 
Path 
Analysis 
528 participants from 
Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk online 
marketplace 
Disclosures on critical audit matters (CAM) reduce 
auditor liability judgements as jurors perceive that 
undetected fraudulent misstatements were more 
foreseeable to the plaintiff, although this finding 
held for only undetected misstatements that were 
difficult to foresee. The authors’ also found that 
CAM disclosures that are unrelated to subsequent 
misstatements neither increase nor reduce auditor 
liability judgements when CAMs are not disclosed, 
but reduce liability judgements when no CAMs 
were reported. Thus, disclosure of any CAM 
(whether related or unrelated) provides litigation 
protection in the event of undetected fraud. 
Consequently, the CAM requirement could 
incentivize auditors to disclose boilerplate CAMs, 
thereby diluting the impact of more warranted CAM 
disclosures. 
Fukukawa and 
Kim (2017) 
ABR Japan N/A Positivist with 
hypotheses testing 
Regression 
analysis 
6,887 observations; 
Japanese non-financial 
firms; 2003-2010 
 
The study examines audit partner involvement in 
client company business risk disclosure. Key 
findings indicate that (i) if the engagements 
partners’ tenure is shorter, a company discloses 
greater and more detailed business risk information; 
(ii) firms with audit partners who have a larger 
number of client engagements disclose greater and 
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more detailed business risk information; and (iii) the 
engagement partner effects are mitigated if they 
belong to a Big 4 firm. 
Heinle and 
Smith (2017) 
RAS N/A Develop a theory of 
risk disclosure 
Normative Theoretical N/A The authors’ demonstrate that risk disclosure 
decreases the firm’s cost of capital and that the 
market response to risk disclosure is small when the 
expected level of risk is high. In addition, the model 
shows that firms disclose more risk information 
when their cash flow risk is greater than expected. 
Yang, Yang, 
Liu and Wu 
(2017) 
EAR US N/A Positivist Regression 
analysis 
11,607 firm-year 
observations from 
2003-2012 
This study uses an innovative text mining approach 
to assess firms’ risks via unstructured textual 
disclosure from annual reports: financial, strategic, 
operational, and hazard risks are identified based on 
an enterprise risk management framework. They 
examine the association between these four risk 
measures and audit fees. The results show that audit 
fees are significantly and positively related to firm-
specific financial, strategic, and operational risks, 
indicating the informativeness of corporate textual 
risk disclosures. 
Heinle, Smith 
and Verrecchia 
(2018) 
TAR N/A Develop a risk 
factor disclosure 
model. 
Positivist   The author’s find that: (i) factor-exposure 
uncertainty introduces skewness and excess kurtosis 
in the cash-flow distribution; (ii) risk--factor 
disclosure affects all moments of that distribution; 
and (iii) the pricing of higher moments affects the 
price response of disclosure and the incentives to 
disclose. For example, factor-exposure uncertainty 
may increase price when the uncertainty implies 
positive skewness in the cash flow distribution. 
Hence, a reduction in uncertainty through disclosure 
may increase cost of capital. 
 
Note: * Countries  comprised: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 
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ABR denotes Accounting and Business Research, AF signifies Accounting Forum, BAR indicates the British Accounting Review, CAR denotes Contemporary Accounting 
Research, EAR represents the European Accounting Review, IJA signifies the International Journal of Accounting, JAPP denotes the Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 
JBFA denotes the Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, RAS denotes the Review of Accounting Studies, and TAR indicates The Accounting Review. 
N/A indicates Not Applicable. 
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Table 3: Key Features of Extant Empirical Studies on FI Disclosure 
 
Author(s)  Method  Sample Size  Standard Industry 
Panel A: Studies on FI Disclosure Standards Issued by the FASB 
Goldberg, Godwin, Tritschler and Myung-Sun (1994) Content analysis 438 SFAS 105 FNF 
Goldberg, Tritschler and Godwin (1998) Content analysis 104 SFAS 105/107 FNF 
Palmer and Schwarz (1995) Content analysis 35 SFAS 105 Banking 
Mahoney and Kawamura (1995) Content analysis 65 SFAS 119                                                  FNF 
Edwards and Eller (1995) Content analysis  10 SFAS 119 Banking 
Kawamura (1996) Content analysis 75 SFAS 119 FNF 
Herz, Bushey and Elmy (1995) Questionnaire/10-K filling 67/78 SFAS 119 NF 
Hodder, Koonce and McAnally (2001) Content analysis 230 SFAS 115 Banking 
Bhamornsiri and Schroeder (2004) Content analysis 30 SFAS 133 FNF 
Hamlen and Largay (2005) Content analysis 30 SFAS 133 Industrial 
Zhang (2009) Content analysis 225 SFAS 133 NF 
Panel B: Studies on FI Disclosure Standards Issued by the IASB 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2006) Disclosure index 55 IAS 32/39 FNF 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2008) Disclosure index 50 IAS 32/39 FNF 
Bischof (2009) Content analysis 171 IFRS 7 Banking 
Bamber and McMeeking (2010) Content  analysis 100 IFRS 7 NF 
Gebhardt (2012) Content analysis 600 IFRS 7 and IAS 39 NF 
Birt, Rankin and Song (2013) Disclosure index 341 IFRS 7 Extractive 
 
Note: This table presents key features about empirical studies on FI disclosure based upon standards issued by the FASB and the IASB. FNF: Financial and non-financial 
firms. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of FI-Related Statements Issued by the FASB 
     Issued     Effective    Statement 
       1990       1991          SFAS 105: Disclosure of information about FI with off-balance sheet risk and FI. 
       1991       1993          SFAS 107: Disclosure about Fair Value of FI. 
       1993       1994          SFAS 115: Accounting for certain investments in debt and equity securities. 
       1994       1995          SFAS 119: Disclosure about derivative FI and Fair Value of FI. 
       1998       2001          SFAS 133: Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. 
       2000       2001          SFAS 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of FI. 
       2003       2004          SFAS 150: Accounting for Certain FI. 
       2006       2007          SFAS 157: Fair value measurements. 
       2007       2008          SFAS 159: The fair value option for financial assets and liabilities. 
       2008       2009          SFAS 161: Disclosures about derivatives instruments and hedging activities. 
       2009       2010          SFAS 166: Accounting for transfers of financial assets. 
Notes: This figure outlines FI-related statements issued by the FASB. Statements are outlined on a 
chronological basis. US firms should apply these statements. 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of FI-Related Standards Issued by the IASB 
     Issued     Effective       Standard 
        1990        1991            IAS 30: Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks. 
        1995         1996           IAS 32: FI: Presentation. 
        1998         2001           IAS 39: FI: Recognition and Measurement. 
        2006         2007           IFRS 7: FI: Disclosure. 
        2009         2015           IFRS 9: FI. 
 
Note: This figure outlines FI-related standards issued by the IASB. Standards are outlined on a chronological 
basis. Companies that adopt IAS/IFRS should apply these standards. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 FI are financial contracts whose values depend on, and are derived from, the value of an underlying asset, 
reference rate or index (Bullen and Porterfield, 1994). Indeed, Lee and Tan (1994) argued that FI can be both 
primary instruments (non-derivatives such as receivables, payables, and equity securities) and secondary 
instruments (derivatives such as forward contracts and options). In practice, derivative instruments generally 
include several types of products such as futures, forwards, swaps and option contracts (Crawford, Wilson 
and Bryan, 1997). 
 
2 The development of FI has triggered a great deal of controversy. For example, Jacque (2010, p.1) quoted 
Warren Buffett by stating that “financial instruments are weapons of mass destruction”. The importance of 
regulating FI disclosures has become increasingly apparent given the sizeable financial collapses and losses 
that have occurred because of  the inappropriate use of, and failure to publish information about, FI products 
(Ighian, 2012; Tahat, 2013). 
 
3 Demands for improved risk reporting as a result of the 2007 global financial crisis include: (i) the Financial 
Stability Forum in Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience 
(2008); (ii) the UK House of Commons Treasury Committee in Banking Crises: Reforming Corporate 
Governance and Pay in the City (2009); (iii) A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other 
Financial Industry Entities (2009); (iv) the European Commission in Corporate Governance in Financial 
Institutions and Remuneration Policies (2010); (v) the UK Financial Reporting Council in Effective Company 
Stewardship: Enhancing Corporate Reporting and Audit (2011); and (vi) the ICAEW in Reporting Business 
Risks: Meeting Expectations (2011). While some of these reports focus on financial institutions in particular, 
others examine risk reporting by businesses in general. 
4 Accounting for trading derivatives is the same as accounting for trading marketable securities marked to 
market and changes in fair values are posted to earnings. Accounting for hedging derivatives would depend 
on hedging effectiveness. 
 
5 Some of the primary advantages of a rules-based system include increased accuracy, reduced ambiguity and 
a diminished possibility of lawsuits. The major weakness of a rules-based system is the complexity in the 
preparation of financial statements (Schipper, 2003). 
 
6 In principles-based accounting, the guidelines are set but not necessarily dictated for every situation, which 
is one of the major concerns pertaining to this type of accounting system. The major benefit of principles-
based accounting is that the guidelines can be applied in a variety of situations/industries, which avoids the 
need for managers to manipulate statements to fit a certain need (Agoglia, Doupknik and Tsakumis, 2011). 
 
7 These approaches are: (i) amending the measurement requirements (e.g. by reducing the number of 
categories of financial instruments); (ii) replacing the existing requirements with a fair value measurement 
principle and some optional exceptions to fair value measurement; and/or (iii) simplifying hedge accounting 
(IASB, 2008). 
 
8 For example, nine articles were published in Accounting in Europe, eight were published in Managerial 
Auditing and six were published in the International Journal of Accounting and Finance. 
9 The model proposed by Abraham and Schrives (2014) leads to three specific questions that can be used to 
assess the relevance of risk factor disclosures: (1) Is risk information specific to the company and are there 
changes to reported risks in risk factor statements over time?; (2) Are significant events identified in prior 
risk factor statements?; and (3) Are significant observed events discussed in subsequent risk factor 
statements? The authors argues that preparers should focus on tailored information that answers these three 
questions, while shareholders should challenge boiler-plate information in annual reports. Finally, the authors 
argue that regulators must be willing to support investors in questioning mediocre disclosures, and auditors 
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need to consider how they can resist boiler plate disclosures. In sum, the authors argue that all of these 
stakeholders need to consider the features of good disclosures and how best they can be encouraged. 
 
10 For example, Procter & Gamble were among many entities that experienced massive losses associated with 
derivative products. They contended that were not fully aware of the riskiness associated with FIs when they 
incurred their losses in 1994 (Hansell, 1996). 
11 This literature has examined countries including Canada (Pérignon and Smith, 2010), France (Combes-
Thuélin, 2006), Italy (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Greco, 2012; Maffei, Aria, Fiondella, Spanò and Zagaria, 
2014), Portugal (Deumes and Knechel, 2008), Kuwait (Al-Shammari, 2014), the United Arab Emirates 
(Hassan, 2014); Malaysia (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Ismail and Rahman, 2013;), the UK (Stanton and 
Stanton, 2002; Linsley and Shrives, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Lawrence, 
2007), the US (Hodder, Koonce and McAnally, 2001; Ahmed, Beatty and Bettinghouse, 2004; Koonce, 
McAnally and Mercer, 2005) and across a number of countries (Dobler, Lajili and Zéghal, 2011; Nur 
Probohudono, Tower and Rusmin, 2013). 
 
12 Specific concerns that have been expressed about IAS 39 include: (1) the criteria for determining which 
instrument must or can be measured in a given way are sometimes complex and difficult to apply; (ii) there 
are no clear requirements for some instruments; (iii) in some cases, management should choose how to 
account for some instruments; (iv) different gains or losses result from different measurement methods and 
two or more measures may be combined; and (v) it is not always easy to determine which measurement 
method has been applied to which instrument or to understand the implications of the differences (Harrington, 
2012). 
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